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SLAM: Sleep-Wake Aware Local Monitoring in Sensor Networks

Abstract
Sleep-wake protocols are critical in sensor networks to ensure long-lived operation. However, an open problem
is how to develop efficient mechanisms that can be incorporated with sleep-wake protocols to ensure both longlived operation and a high degree of security. Our contribution in this paper is to address this problem by using
local monitoring, a powerful technique for detecting and mitigating control/data attacks in sensor networks. In
local monitoring, a node oversee part of the traffic going in and out of its neighbors to determine if the behavior is
suspicious, such as, delay in forwarding a packet. However, a direct application of local monitoring will interfere
with sleep-wake protocols by having nodes stay awake for the purpose of monitoring. In this work, we present a
protocol called SLAM to make local monitoring parsimonious in its energy consumption and integrate it with any
extant sleep-wake protocol in the network. The challenge is to enable this in a secure manner and this is addressed
in the face of nodes that may be adversarial and not wake up nodes responsible for monitoring its traffic. We
prove analytically that security coverage is not weakened by the sleeping. We perform simulation experiments to
demonstrate that the performance of local monitoring is practically unchanged while listening energy savings of
30 to 129 times, depending on the network load, is achieved.
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Introduction

Sensor networks are typically comprised of large numbers of sensor nodes placed in the environment to be
monitored. These nodes cooperate among themselves for information gathering and analysis, and are becoming an
important platform in several domains, including military warfare, civilian emergency operations, scientific
explorations, and monitoring of climate and biological habitats. The open nature of the wireless communication
channels, the lack of infrastructure, the fast deployment practices, and the hostile environments where they may
be deployed, make them vulnerable to a wide range of security attacks. The attacks could involve eavesdropping,
message tampering, or identity spoofing, all of which have been addressed by customized cryptographic
primitives for sensor networks. Alternately, the attacks may be targeted to the control or the data traffic in sensor
networks. Typical examples of control traffic are routing, monitoring the liveness of a node, topology discovery,
and distributed location determination. Different kinds of control traffic attacks have been proposed in the
literature, such as, the wormhole attack, the rushing attack, the Sybil attack, the sinkhole attack, and the HELLO
flood attack. Control traffic attacks are especially destructive since they can be launched even without having
access to any cryptographic keys or compromising any legitimate node in the network and they can be used to
subvert the functionality of the network by disrupting data flow.
To mitigate such attacks, many researchers have used the concept of cooperative local monitoring within a
node’s neighborhood ([30]-[37]). In neighborhood monitoring (or local monitoring), nodes oversee part of the
traffic going in and out of their neighbors. Many protocols have been built on top of neighbor monitoring for
intrusion detection (e.g., [29] [30]), building trust and reputation among nodes (e.g. [33] [34]), protecting against
control and data traffic attacks (e.g. [35]-[38]) and in building secure routing protocols (e.g. [31] [32] [36]).
Specifically, in [36] and [37] the authors have presented a technique for detection of control and data attacks in
ad-hoc networks using local monitoring. Control attacks are launched by delaying, dropping, modifying, or
fabricating forwarded traffic and can be detected by a group of neighbors, called guard nodes, performing local
monitoring. The guard nodes are normal nodes in the network and perform the basic operations of sensing, in
addition to monitoring. The same attack primitives applied to data traffic can also be detected by local monitoring.
However, local monitoring could come at a high cost for energy constrained senor networks, since it requires the
guard nodes to be awake all the time to oversee network behavior. To the best of our knowledge, no one has
studied sleeping protocols for optimizing the energy overhead of monitoring while maintaining the quality of the
monitoring service. This is the problem we address in this paper. The main challenge lies in providing a secure
sleeping technique that is not vulnerable to security attacks and does not add to the vulnerability of the network.
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In this paper we propose a set of mechanisms (SLAM) that adapt the existing local monitoring technique to
significantly reduce the time a node needs to be awake for the purpose of monitoring. The proposed mechanism
adapts itself depending on the kind of sleeping protocol used in the network, henceforth referred to as the baseline
sleeping protocol (BSP). For networks that use synchronized sleeping algorithms (e.g., [4] [18]-[22]), i.e., nodes
wakeup and go to sleep in a synchronized manner, SLAM does not need to do anything. There exist several
application-specific sleeping algorithms, for example, to maintain a given sensing coverage (each point should be
sensed by at least k nodes) or a given network connectivity level (each pair of nodes should have k disjoint paths).
For these protocols (e.g., [6]-[12] [16]), SLAM can serve neighbor monitoring as well by modifying an input
parameter to the existing sleeping algorithm. The exact modification depends on the BSP itself and we provide in
the paper an example of adapting a coverage protocol. Finally, for those networks that have no existing BSP or
have on-demand sleep-wake, i.e., nodes are woken up at arbitrary times determined by the communication, SLAM
provides a generic on-demand sleeping algorithm, called On-Demand SLAM. This algorithm assumes that in
addition to the normal antenna, each node has a passive or a low-power wake-up antenna. A node that is not
involved in network activities, such as, data forwarding is ordinarily sleeping according to the BSP. However, for
monitoring purposes, it is woken up on demand by a neighboring node using the wake-up antenna.
On- demand SLAM has to account for the fact that wake-up antennas have a delay in waking up nodes on
receiving the control signal. By a suitable design, we prevent the additional delay due to sleep-wake from
becoming cumulative with the number of hops between the communicating pair of nodes. Instead, a pipelined
effect is achieved and the additional delay becomes constant independent of the number of hops. We provide
theoretical analysis for energy saving using On-Demand SLAM compared to a baseline monitoring protocol [37].
We build a simulation model for SLAM using ns-2 and perform a comparative evaluation of local monitoring with
and without SLAM. The results show that the performance of local monitoring in terms of false and missed alarms
is very close in both cases while the overhead of SLAM in terms of listening energy is between 30 to 129 times
lower, depending on the network traffic. The results show the effect of the number of malicious nodes, the traffic
load, and the fraction of data being monitored on the overhead of local monitoring.
We summarize our contributions in this paper as follows:
1. We provide a technique for conserving energy while performing local monitoring without significantly
degrading its security performance. This we believe is fundamental to deploying local monitoring in any
energy conscious network.
2. We propose a generic on-demand sleep-wake algorithm for network monitoring in scenarios where either no
application-specific sleeping algorithm exists or the sleep-wake is based on arbitrary communication pattern.
3. We analytically prove that SLAM does not add any vulnerability to the existing local monitoring technique.
4. We conduct extensive simulation experiments on an existing local monitoring technique with and without
SLAM and show a significant reduction in monitoring cost with negligible degradation in the monitoring
quality of service.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents related work in the field of sleep-wake
protocols. Section 3 describes SLAM. Section 4 presents mathematical analysis of the energy overhead and
security of SLAM. Section 5 presents the simulation experiments and results. Section 6 concludes the paper.
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Related Work

Node sleeping is an important mechanism to prolong the life time of sensor networks. This topic has been
discussed extensively in the literature and many protocols have been proposed for various types of applications
such as object tracking [1]-[2]. It has been realized that under current hardware designs, the maximum energy
savings can be achieved through putting nodes to sleep—three orders of magnitude less current draw than in an
idle node for the popular Mica mote platform for sensor nodes.
Primarily three different mechanisms are used to put nodes to sleep. The first is called synchronized wakeupsleep scheduling in which the nodes in the network are put to sleep and woken up at the same time in a centralized
(e.g., [21] [22]) or a distributed manner (e.g. [4] [18]-[20]). A disadvantage of such protocols is that the duty cycle
is application dependent and not known a priori. Most importantly, they require the network to have an accurate
time synchronization service. Furthermore, in scenarios with rare event detection, no event happens and the nodes
enter sleep mode again in most of the wakeup periods. This means that nodes wake up too often resulting in
2

wastage of energy. The second mechanism is based on selecting a subset of nodes to be woken up to maintain
some properties in the network, such as sensing coverage (e.g., [6]-[12]), network connectivity (e.g., [4] [5] [13][15]), or both coverage and connectivity (e.g. [16]).
The third mechanism is based on-demand sleep-wake protocols. These on-demand sleep-wake protocols use
either special purpose low-power wake-up antennas (e.g., [23]-[26]) or passive wake-up antennas [27]. These
antennas are responsible for receiving an appropriate beacon from a neighbor node and waking up the node for its
full operation. Thus, for environments where events of interest are relatively rare, the time for the low power
operation with the wake-up antennas being on, dominates. Further details about the operation of the antennas are
mentioned in Section 3.4 where SLAM uses these antennas for waking up guard nodes.
Many sensor applications require security and reliability; therefore, researchers consider designing dependable
sensor networks that behave reliably and securely. Neighbor monitoring is a well-known technique that is used for
securing sensor network protocols. However, to the best of our knowledge none of the previous local monitoring
protocols consider operating in a network where nodes may need to be put to sleep for energy conservation.
Therefore, we are the first to address this issue.

3

SLAM Protocol Description

The primary goal of SLAM is to minimize the time a node has to be awake to perform local monitoring. Local
monitoring is used to make sure that packets are not dropped, delayed, modified, or forged along the path from
source to destination [36]. SLAM adds one more task to the list of events that a guard node needs to monitor—
verifying whether the node being monitored wakes up the requisite guards or fails to do so due to malicious
motivations. Depending on the BSP used in the network, SLAM has three different mechanisms for proposing
sleeping for networks with local monitoring—The No-Action-Required SLAM protocol, the Adapted SLAM
protocol, and the On-Demand SLAM protocol.

3.1

System Model and Assumptions

SLAM assumes that the network is static and the links are bi-directional. SLAM requires a pre-distribution pairwise key management protocol (e.g. [40], [41]) such that any two nodes can acquire a key for encryption and
authentication. In On-Demand SLAM, each node is equipped with either a passive [27] or a low-power wakeup
antenna [24]. Any two nodes that need to communicate, establish a route between them using an underlying
routing protocol. We assume that the source node is honest. No assumption is made about the adversary nodes
following the sleep-wake protocol, only the honest nodes follow it. Each node knows its first-hop neighbors and
the neighbors of each neighbor, e.g., using a technique as in [36]. Malicious behavior is manifested through
delaying, dropping, fabricating, or modifying packets. The malicious behavior of fruitlessly sending a wake-up
signal to a node is not addressed since this potential exists in any on-demand wake-up protocol and SLAM neither
exacerbates nor solves this problem.

3.2

The No-Action-Required SLAM Protocol

This scheme is used in a network that has a sleeping algorithm which is completely compatible with local
monitoring. Such sleep algorithms fall in a class of protocols in which the network (or the communicating parts of
the network) is synchronized in its sleep-wake schedule and all the nodes wake up and go to sleep in distributed
or centralized synchrony. Examples of such protocols include Span [4], S-MAC [19], habitat monitoring [22], and
those used in applications of sensor networks in [18][20][21]. In this BSP, the guards for the communication
would also be woken up since, by definition, the guards are one-hop neighbors of the two nodes that form the link
on which the communication is taking place. Thus, for this class of protocols, no modification is necessary to
support sleeping and waking up of guards for local monitoring purposes. Local monitoring in such scenarios does
not incur any additional overhead on the network aside from the computational overhead.

3.3

The Adapted SLAM Protocol

This scheme is used for the class comprising coverage and/or connectivity preserving sleep-wake protocols.
Examples of such kinds of sleeping algorithms are [6]-[12][16]. However, since these algorithms may be
application-specific, each one of them may need to be adapted differently to support sleeping of guards as well.
Here we will consider a representative sub-class of BSP from this class.
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Consider for example the class of protocols that seeks to preserve Ks-coverage or Kc-connectivity in a network
and puts nodes off to sleep without violating these properties. The property of Ks-coverage (s for sensing) denotes
that every point in the field is sensed by at least Ks nodes. The property of Kc-connectivity (c for coverage)
denotes that for critical communication, such as, between a node and the base station, at least Kc routes exist. The
fundamental technique for adapting such sleeping algorithms to support sleeping of guards is to modify the value
of Ks or Kc and invoke the original BSP.
Consider a protocol that preserves coverage at Ks
([6]-[12]). Assume that the sensing range is Rs, the
M
The transmission
communication range is Rc, the detection
range
confidence is g. In local monitoring, γ is defined as
X
Y
the minimum number of neighbors of a node, X, to
The sensing range
convince another neighbor of X, say Y, that X is
N
A guard node
malicious if Y does not directly detect X as
malicious [37]. Assume the requisite number of
Figure 1: Relationship between communication and
guards needed for detection with sufficiently low
sensing ranges
missed and false alarm rates is Γ (Γ ≥ γ).
We shall try to find a relationship between Ks, Rs, Rc, and g with the help of Figure 1. What is the value of Ks to
guarantee the number of guards is Γ? Let the density of the nodes in the network be ρ and the density of awake
(or alive) nodes be ρl = Ks/πRs2. Let the common communication area between X and Y be Ac. Assume uniform
distribution of the awake nodes.
The number of nodes that are awake in Ac (Nw) is given by
K
[1]
N w = Ac ⋅ ρl = Ac s 2
π Rs
Therefore, the required value of Ks to get Γ guards is given by,
N
Γ
K s = w ⋅ π Rs 2 =
⋅ π Rs 2
Ac
Ac

[2]

The common communication area Ac for two nodes separated by a distance x is given by

Ac = 2 Rc 2 cos −1 ( x / 2 Rc ) − x Rc 2 − x 2 / 4

[3]

The minimum value of this is achieved when x = Rc and the value is given by Ac,min = 1.23Rc . Thus, the protocol
needs to be invoked with a value of
2

Ks =

Γ
Ac ,min

⎛R ⎞
Γ
⋅ π Rs =
⋅ π Rs 2 = 2.55 ⋅ Γ ⋅ ⎜ s ⎟
2
1.23Rc
⎝ Rc ⎠
2

2

[4]

This will guarantee that the requisite number of guard nodes is awake to provide detection through local
monitoring. Thus, Adapted SLAM invokes the BSP with the increased value of the parameter Ks.

3.4

The On-Demand SLAM Protocol

This protocol is used in a network that either has no BSP in operation or employs on-demand sleep-wake
protocols. Therefore, we build a new sleep-wake protocol, called On-Demand SLAM that enables the guards to go
sleep when not required for monitoring. The high level approach we take is on-demand sleep-wake of the guards
rather than scheduling the sleep-wake periods. The defining characteristic of on-demand sleep-wake protocols is
that any node in the network may, at random, initiate communication with any other node in the network. A sleepwake protocol does not impose any fixed communication pattern in the network. On-Demand SLAM uses either
low-power wake-up antennas (e.g., [23]-[26]) or passive antennas with circuitry that can harvest signal energy to
trigger a node to wake up [27], as has been described in Section 2 (“Related Work”). These kinds of antennas are
commercially available (e.g. [26]) as well as in research labs (e.g., [27]). For example Austriamicrosystems
provides a low-power wake-up receiver (AS3931) with data rate of 2.731 KB/s and current consumption in
standby mode of 6.6uA [26]. Data transmission and reception require good channel quality, high speed, and thus
complex and power consuming hardware, while channel monitoring has the sole purpose of getting binary
4

information whether a packet targeted at this node is coming. In the rest of the paper, for ease of exposition we
use the term “low-power wake-up radio” to mean either the low-power wake-up hardware or the passive wake-up
hardware which consumes no power at all.
In On-Demand SLAM, the low-power wake-up radio remains awake all the time while the normal radio is put to
sleep when it is not sending or receiving data or is not required for monitoring. If a node is to send a packet out, it
simply wakes up by itself; if a neighbor node is to send a packet to this node, the sender will send a short wake-up
beacon using the wake-up radio channel, and on receiving this beacon the wake-up radio triggers the normal radio
to be ready for the reception. The main disadvantage of the mechanism is that it still consumes extra energy. Even
though the power consumed is small compared to the normal antenna (1uW compared to 10mW in [23]), the
energy is non-negligible due to long time of operation.
Hence this mechanism has been modified to use passive wake-up antennas, known as radio-triggered power
management mechanisms [27]. In this mechanism a special hardware component – a radio-triggered circuit – is
connected to one of the interrupt inputs of the processor. The circuit itself does not draw any current and is thus
passive. The node can enter sleep mode without periodic wake-up. The wake-up mode is the usual working mode
with all the functional units ready to work, and the average wake-up mode current is 20mA [27]. In sleep mode, a
node shuts down all its components except the memory, interrupt handler, and the timer and the sleep mode
current is 100uA [27]. When a network node changes from sleep mode to wake-up mode, there is a surge current
of 30mA for a maximum of 5ms [27]. When a power management message is sent by another node within a
certain distance, the radio-triggered circuit collects enough energy to trigger the interrupt to wake up the node.
Except for activating the wake-up interrupt, the radio-triggered circuit is independent of any other components on
the node. If supported by hardware, the wake-up packet is sent at a special radio frequency. Other types of radio
communication, at a different radio frequency, do not wake up the nodes even if the nodes are within the radio
communication range. Note that hardware cost for adding multiple-frequency support is usually fairly low. Many
recent low-end radio transceivers support multiple frequency operations [28].
The basic idea in designing On-Demand SLAM is for a node to wake up the requisite guard nodes to perform
local monitoring on the communication it is going to send or forward on its outgoing link. The challenge in the
design comes from the fact that any of the nodes (except the source) may be malicious and therefore may not
faithfully wake up the guards. Local monitoring [36] [37] is used to mitigate malicious activities manifested
through dropping, delaying, modifying, or forging of packets along the path from source to destination. In local
monitoring, the sensor node is called a guard when performing traffic overhearing and monitoring of neighbors.
The guards of a node A over the incoming packets from a transmitter X are the common neighbors of X and A.
In Figure 2, α1 and β1 are the guards of H1 over the
link SÆH1. Information for each packet sent from X to
α2
α1
A is saved in a watch buffer at each guard for a time Tw.
Z
The information maintained depends on the particular
attack primitive to be detected (i.e., drop, delay,
S
H2
Hn-1
D
H1
modify, or forge). A malicious counter (MalC(i,j)) is
W
β1
β2
maintained at each guard node, i, for every node, j,
which i is monitoring. MalC(i,j) is incremented for any
Figure 2: n-hop route between S and D, neighbors
suspect malicious activity of j that is detected by i.
of S, and guards of H1 and H2
To account for intermittent natural failures that can occur at legitimate nodes, a node is determined to be
misbehaving, only if the MalC goes above a threshold. When MalC(i,j) crosses the threshold, node i isolates node
j refraining from sending or receiving any packet from node j. Node j is said to be isolated from the network when
all its neighbors isolate it. We use the scenario depicted in Figure 2 to explain On-Demand SLAM. A source node
S is sending data to a destination node D through an n-hop route SÆH1ÆH2Æ…ÆHn-1ÆD. In a network where
all the nodes are honest, S will wake up the next hop H1 and the guard nodes (α1 and β1) before sending the packet
to H1. In turn H1 will wake up H2 and guard nodes α2 and β2 before sending the packet on the next hop and so on,
till the packet reaches D. Formally, according to [37], the responsibility of a guard node α of Hi+1 over a link
Hi→Hi+1 is to verify that:
1. Hi+1 forwards the packet within time Tw
5

2. Hi+1 does not modify the packet it is forwarding
3. Hi+1 only forwards a packet if a packet is sent on the Hi→Hi+1 link
SLAM introduces a fourth responsibility.
4. Hi+1 should wake up the guards for the communication on the Hi+1→Hi+2 link before forwarding the
packet on that link
If a rule 1-3 is violated then the MalC value is incremented by appropriate amount; if rule 4 is violated, the
MalC value increment is the maximum of the other MalC values because this rule violation may be used to mask
violations of any of the rules 1-3.
In general for any multi-hop route connecting a source node S to a destination node D, S is responsible for
waking up the correct guards for H1, and Hi is responsible for waking up the correct guards of Hi+1 (1 ≤ i ≤ n-2).
The correct guards for H1 are guaranteed to be woken up by the assumption of honest source S and whether Hi
honestly wakes up the next hop guards is monitored by the guards of Hi according to rule 4 above.
In the following we present two variations of On-Demand SLAM depending on the wake-up mechanism a node
follows to wake up the guards of next-hop.
3.4.1

Guards-Only On-Demand SLAM (G-SLAM)

The high level design goal in G-SLAM is to minimize the energy wasted in waking up nodes that can not serve
as guards. On average half of the nodes within a single transmission range are not guards over a certain link
(according to Equation I in [37]). In Figure 2, α1 and β1 are valid guards of H1 over the link from S to H1, while Z
and W are not. Also, note that the energy spent in warm up (transition between sleep mode and wakeup mode) is
relatively high (almost 3 times as much as the energy spent in listening for the antennas described in [27]).
Therefore, waking up the appropriate nodes saves considerable amount of energy.
For a guard node to verify honest wake-up, G-SLAM requires each node in the network to know, in addition to
the identities of its first-hop and second-hop neighbors that are required by local monitoring, the location of each
node within twice of its transmission range. In Figure 2, a guard of H1, say α1, knows the location of its neighbor
H1 and the location of all the neighbors of H1, S, β1, β2, α2, and H2. Using this information, α1 knows the common
neighbors of H1 and H2, α2 and β2, which can act as the guards of H2 over the link H1ÆH2. Therefore, α1 can not
be deceived by H1 waking up its neighbors that can not be guards for H2 (S and β1). A disadvantage of G-SLAM is
that it requires sophisticated wakeup hardware for a node to wake up a subset of nodes within the communication
range using an id-attached beacon [27].
We explain G-SLAM algorithm with the help of Figure 2. Assume that node S has some data to be sent for the
destination D over the route SÆH1ÆH2Æ…ÆHn-1ÆD connecting S to D. G-SLAM uses the following steps to
wake up the correct guards along the route from S to D:
1. Node S sends a signal to wake up the first-hop node (H1) and the guards for H1 (a1, b1). This signal could be
either unicast to each of H1, α1, and β1 or a multicast signal that contains the identities of H1, α1, and β1. This
signal is guaranteed to wake up the correct guards of H1 due to the assumption of honest source S.
2. Node S sends the packets it has to H1 following the timing schedules presented in Section 3.4.3.
3. Nodes H1, a1, and b1 after being woken up continue to remain awake for Tw. Tw is a parameter of local
monitoring that captures the maximum time by which an entry in the watch buffer is evicted (beyond that is
evidence of malicious action) [37]. Each time a new packet is sent from S to H1, Tw is reinitialized. After Tw
expires at a node, it goes back to sleep.
4. Node H1, after being woken up, uses the timing schedule in Section 3.4.3 to schedule a wake-up signal for H2
and the guards of H2 over the link H1→H2 (a2,b2). The guards of H1 over the link S→H1 are responsible for
verifying that H1 fulfills this requirement.
5. The process continues at each step up to the destination.

6

3.4.2

All-Neighbors On-Demand SLAM (A-SLAM)

The high level design goal of A-SLAM is to relax the assumption that every node knows the location of its firsthop and second-hop neighbors, and to simplify the wakeup signal and the wakeup hardware. Consider a node S
that has some data to send for the destination D over the route SÆH1ÆH2Æ…ÆHn-1ÆD, Figure 2. A-SLAM uses
the following steps to wakeup the guards along the route from S to D:
1. Node S broadcasts a wake-up signal to all its first-hop neighbors (Z,W,H1,a1,b1). The wake-up signal includes
the identity of both the current sender (S) and the next-hop (H1).
2. Each neighbor of S, after being woken up, decides whether to stay awake or go back to sleep based on the
role that it may play on the ongoing communication. If that neighbor is the next-hop (H1), it stays a wake to
forward the data and to monitor the next-hop from it (H2). If that neighbor is a guard (α1,β1) for the next-hop
(H1), it stays awake to monitor the behavior of H1. Finally, if that neighbor is neither a guard for H1 nor a
next-hop, it goes back to sleep immediately.
3. Node S sends the data packet it has to H1 following the timing schedules presented in Section 3.4.3.
4. Nodes H1, a1, and b1 after being woken up continue to do so for Tw. Each time a new packet is sent from S to
H1, Tw is reinitialized. After Tw expires at a node, it goes back to sleep.
5. H1 does the same steps that S did to wake up the next-hop (H2) and its guards (α2,β2).
6. The process continues at each step to the destination.
This scheme results in an increase in the energy consumption compared to G-SLAM due to the wake-up of the
neighbors that are not guards.
3.4.3

Timing of the Wakeup Signal

In this section we generate the timing schedules for signaling the wake-up of nodes using On-Demand SLAM.
This is important because the wake-up antennas have a warm-up period and this could increase the end-to-end
delay of the communication. We design SLAM to send the wake-up signal at the earliest possibility so that the
additional delay due to the sleep-wake protocol does not add up but is instead a constant independent of the
number of hops.
Let Tcontrol be the time to send the wake-up packet to the radio-triggered antenna, Twarmup be the time for a node
to be fully awake and functional from the time it receives the wake-up packet (5 ms for Stankovic et al.’s antenna
[27]), and Tdata be the time to send a data packet which includes the forwarding time at intermediate nodes,
therefore, within Tdata, an intermediate node completely receives a data packet and it can immediately start
sending it. Moreover, let Tw be the maximum time a guard, after being woken up, waits for the packet to be
forwarded. If the packet is not forwarded in this time, malicious action is suspected. Finally, let Twake be the time a
node continues to be awake after being woken up.
Let us consider an isolated (no other flows interfere with it) flow between S and D, separated by h hops. The
intermediate nodes are n1, n2, …, nh-1. Let gi represents the guards of node ni over the link ni-1Æni. Let vi
represents the neighbors of ni that are not guards of ni+1 over the link niÆni+1. Consider the following two disjoint
cases based on the relation between (Tcontrol + Twarmup) and Tdata. The analysis assumes a node is sleeping when it
receives the wake-up signal. If not, the node just prolongs, if necessary, its wake-up time to meet the requirement
imposed by the new wake-up signal. For example, assume a guard node G is currently awake till Current_time + δ
due to some other activity (forward data, guard for another link, etc.). Assume that G receives at Current_time a
wakeup signal that require G to stay awake till Current_time + Δ. Then, if δ ≥ Δ, G does not need to do anything,
otherwise G prolongs its wake-up time by Δ-δ and goes to sleep at Current_time + Δ instead of Current_time + δ.
Case I: (Tcontrol + Twarmup) > Tdata with t = (Tcontrol + Twarmup) – Tdata
Figure 3 shows the timing schedule for this case. Figure 3 (a) shows the timing schedule for a node in the route
between the source and the destination. The node, n1, wakes up at T3 and goes to sleep at T8, where T8-T3 = Tdata
(to receive data) + t (wait for the next-hop to be ready to receive the data) + Tdata (send the data to the next-hop) +
{t + Tdata} (as a guard for n2) = 3Tdata+2t. Figure 3 (b) shows the timing schedule for a guard node. The guard, g1,
wakes up at T3 and goes to sleep at T6, where T6-T3 = Tdata (to overhear incoming data to the node being
monitored, n1) + t (wait for the next-hop to be ready to receive the data) + Tdata (to overhear outgoing data from
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the node being monitored, n1) = 2Tdata +t. Figure 3 (c), only meaningful for A-SLAM, shows the schedule for a
node that is a neighbor to a node in the route from the source to the destination but is not a guard node. The node,
v1, wakes up at T3, determines that it can not be a guard, and thus go back to sleep immediately.
n1 awake, S
sends data,
S sends n1 rcvs n sends
1
wakeup wakeup wakeup

n2 awake, n1
sends data,
n2 rcvs
n2 sends
data
wakeup

n1 rcvs
data

n3 awake, n2
sends data,
n3 sends
wakeup

n3 rcvs
data, n1
sleep

(a)
T1

T2
Tcontrol

T3
Twarmup

T4

g1 awake, S
sends data,
S sends g1 rcvs n sends
1
wakeup wakeup wakeup
(b)
T1
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Tcontrol
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τ

Tdata

g1
overhear
in data to
n1
T4

T6
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wakeup

τ

T8
Tdata

g1 overhear
out data from n1, g2
overhear in data to
n2, g1 sleep

T5

Tdata

T7
τ

Tdata

…

…

T6
Tdata

S sends v1 rcvs v1 awake, v1
wakeup wakeup sleep

…

(c)
T1

T2
Tcontrol

T3
Twarmup

Figure 3: Case I wakeup-sleep timing schedule for (a) a node in the data route; (b) a guard node; (c) a
neighbor to a node in the data route that is not valid guard (for A-SLAM only)

(a)

n4 awake, n3
n2 awake, n1
n3 awake, n2
rcvs data, n3
S sends n1 rcvs n1 awake, S n1 sends rcvs data, n1 n2 sends rcvs data, n n3 sends sends data,
2
wakeup wakeup sends data wakeup sends data wakeup sends data wakeup n sleep
1

…

T1

T2
Tcontrol

T3

T4
τ

Twarmup

Tcm= Tcontrol + Twarmup

T5

T6
τ

Tcm
Tdata

T7
τ

Tcm
Tdata

g3 awake, g1 overhear
out data from n1, g2
overhear in data to n2,
n2 sends data, g1 sleep

…

(b)
T2
Tcontrol

T3
Twarmup

Tcm= Tcontrol + Twarmup

T4
τ

T5
Tcm

Tdata

T6
τ

Tcm
Tdata

g2 awake, g1
overhear in
S sends g1 rcvs g1 awake, S n1 sends data to n , n n2 sends
1
1
wakeup wakeup sends data wakeup sends data wakeup
T1

T9

T8

T7
Tcm

Tdata

Figure 4: Case II wakeup-sleep timing schedule for (a) a node in the data route; (b) a guard node
According to SLAM, each node sends a wake-up signal at the earliest possible opportunity (as soon as it is
awake) to minimize the delay. From Figure 3, it can be seen that per hop, the delay incurred is Tcontrol + Twarmup and
at the last hop, the delay due to data (Tdata) gets exposed.
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Case II: (Tcontrol + Twarmup) ≤ Tdata with t = Tdata – (Tcontrol + Twarmup)
Figure 4 shows the timing schedule for this case. Figure 4 (a) shows the schedule for a node in the route between
the source and the destination. The node, n1, wakes up at T3 and goes to sleep at T9, where T9-T3 = Tdata (to receive
data) + Tdata (send the data to the next-hop) + Tdata (as a guard for n2) = 3Tdata. Figure 4 (b) shows the schedule for
a guard node. The guard, g1, wakes up at T3 and goes to sleep at T7, where T7-T3 = Tdata (to overhear incoming data
to the node being monitored, n1) + Tdata (to overhear outgoing data from the node being monitored, n1) = 2Tdata.
The timing schedule for a node that is a neighbor to a node in the route from the source to the destination but is
not a guard node is the same as its peer in Case I.

4
4.1

Mathematical Analysis of On-Demand SLAM
Security Analysis

Here we prove that On-Demand SLAM does not degrade the security performance of local monitoring [37].
Specifically, we will prove the following premise.
Premise: Due to the sleep-wake mechanism for guards in SLAM, no loss in detection coverage occurs.
For this we prove that for any node Hi in the path S→D (i =1, …, n-1),
i. Either, the guards for Hi+1 on the link Hi→Hi+1 are awake (and monitoring) at the time communication
takes place on the link, or
ii. Hi is suspected of malicious action
We prove this using the first principle of mathematical induction.
Let the guards of H1 over the link S→H1 form the set G1, Hn-1→D the set Gn, and Hi-1→Hi the set Gi.
Base case: The source S is honest and therefore it wakes up the guard nodes in G1.
Inductive hypothesis: All nodes H1, …, Hi (i ≥ 1) are honest and have woken up the appropriate guards, or have
been suspected of malicious action.
To prove: Node Hi+1 is either honest and wakes up the guard nodes in Hi+2 or will be suspected of malicious
action.
Case 1: One or more of the nodes H1, …, Hi have been suspected of malicious action.
Case 2: All the nodes H1, …, Hi have woken up the appropriate guards.
Proof Case 1: In this case, the malicious action(s) could be detected by rules 1-3 or rule 4 of Section 3.4. If the
former, then it does not affect a guard being woken up and all guards in sets G2, …, Gi have been woken up. If the
latter, then one or more of the guard nodes in the sets G2, …, Gi have not been woken up. If the node, say Hk, does
not wake up the requisite guards, then it will be suspected by rule 4 and its MalC counter value will be
incremented.
Proof Case 2: All the nodes in H1, …, Hi have woken up the guards in the sets G2, …, Gi+1.
Now Gi+1 is monitoring if Hi+1 is sending a wake-up signal to the guards of Hi+2 over the link Hi+1→Hi+2 i.e., Gi+2.
If Hi+1 is honest and performs this action, rule 4 is not triggered. But if Hi+1does not perform this action, then rule
4 is triggered and Hi+1 is suspected of malicious action.
Therefore, by the principle of mathematical induction, it is proved that either all guards are woken up at the
time of monitoring a communication or the malicious nodes are suspected. Since the detection of the guards
according to rules 1-3 is not changed from baseline local monitoring, this proves that no loss of detection
coverage happens due to SLAM.

4.2

Energy and End-to-End Delay Analysis

Here we calculate the worst case end-to-end delay of communication with local monitoring without sleep-wake
(Baseline-LM) and with On-Demand SLAM. Moreover, an upper bound in the consumed energy is computed for
SLAM and for the case with on-demand sleep-wake and no monitoring (Baseline-OD). For SLAM, the energy is
calculated separately for a node which is forwarding packets (and, by definition, acting as a guard node), a node
which is acting just as a guard, and a node that is in the vicinity of the path but is neither a forwarder nor a guard.
In addition to the notations defined in Section 3.4.3, let Atransmit be the current to transmit (at the middle of the
transmit range), which is 27mA for Mica2 motes [43]. Let Awarmup be the current consumed during the transition
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from sleep to wakeup (warm up), which is 30mA for Mica2 motes [43]. Finally, let Aactive be the current in the
computationally active mode = the current in the idle listening mode = the current in receive mode, which is 8mA
for Mica2 motes [43].
Let us consider a flow between S and D, separated
by h hops. The intermediate nodes are n1, n2, …, nh-1.
The bounding box around S and D covers all possible
r
r
S
D
2r
nodes, including forwarding nodes and guard nodes
that may be involved in the communication between S
and D. The size of the bounding box is 2r(h+1)r =
(h+1)r
2r2(h+1), where r is the transmission range, Figure 5.
A sensor node
Communication range
S - D Bounding path
For On-Demand SLAM, consider the two wakeup-sleep
scheduling cases of Section 3.4.3.
Figure 5: A bounding box over the path S ÆD
Case I: (Tcontrol + Twarmup) > Tdata with t = (Tcontrol + Twarmup) – Tdata
From Figure 3 it can be seen that delay at the first link (SÆn1) is Tcontrol + Twarmup + Tdata. Over each of the
succeeding links, the delay is Tcontrol + Twarmup since the delay due to data (Tdata) gets exposed. This is due the
sleep-wake schedule process that SLAM uses where the wake-up signal is sent at the earliest opportunity.
Therefore, the end-to-end delay in SLAM, ΩSLAM(h), for the communication from S to D is
Ω SLAM (h) = Tcontol + Twarmup + Tdata + (h − 1)(Tcontrol + Twarmup ) = h ⋅ (Tcontrol + Twarmup ) + Tdata
(5)
The end-to-end delay in Baseline-LM is

Ω Base − LM ( h) = h ⋅ Tdata

(6)

In this case, the additional end-to-end delay imposed by SLAM depends on the number of hops between S and D

Ω SLAM − Add (h) = Ω SLAM (h) − Ω Base − LM (h) = h ⋅ τ + Tdata

(7)

Next, we compute the consumed energy for both Baseline-OD and On-Demand SLAM.
Baseline-OD: here only the forwarding nodes are involved in the sleep-wake protocol. Using Figure 3 (a), a
forwarding node ni (i = 1, …, h-1) spends Twarmup = T3-T2 warming up with current consumption of Awarmup, Tdata =
T4-T3 receiving data with current consumption of Aactive, t = T5-T4 idle waiting for the next-hop to be ready with
current consumption of Aactive, and Tdata = T6-T5 sending data with current consumption of Atransmit. Therefore, the
energy expended by a forwarding node ni (i = 1, …, h-1) is

ε f ,base = Twarmup ⋅ Awarmup + (Tcontrol + Twarmup ) ⋅ Aactive + Tdata ⋅ Atransmit

(8)

S spends Tcontrol + Twarmup = T3-T1 idle waiting for n1 to wake up with Aactive and Tdata = T4-T3 transmitting data
with Atransmit. Therefore, the energy expended by S is
ε S ,base = (Tcontrol + Twarmup ) ⋅ Aactive + Tdata ⋅ Atransmit
(9)
D spends Twarmup warming up with Awarmup and Tdata receiving data with Aactive. Therefore, the energy expended
by D is
ε D ,base = Twarmup ⋅ Awarmup + Tdata ⋅ Aactive
(10)
On-Demand SLAM: here the sleep-wake protocol involves, in addition to S and D, the forwarding nodes, the
guard nodes, the neighbors of the forwarding nodes that are not guards. We will compute separately for the three
kinds of nodes (i) forwarding nodes; (ii) guard nodes that do not act as forwarders; (iii) remaining nodes. The
energy of S and D is the same as that of Baseline-OD.
(i) Energy expended by a forwarding node ni (i = 1, …, h-1) εf,SLAM ≤ εf,base + Tw . Aactive. The additional energy is
consumed because ni has to look to see if ni+1 forwards the packet that it was just handed by ni. The inequality
comes in because Tw is the worst case time in case ni+1 is malicious.
(ii) Energy expended by a guard node that is not a forwarding node εg,SLAM ≤ Twarmup . Awarmup + Tdata . Aactive + Tw .
Aactive. Consider for example the guard g1 of n1 over the link SÆn1. g1 has to listen to the communication
between S to n1 and then has to stay listening for a maximum of Tw to see that n1 forwarded the packet.
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(iii) Energy expended by a node in the bounding box around S and D that is neither a forwarding node nor a guard
node (the “other node”, hence the notation “o” in the subscript). For G-SLAM where the wake-up signal is
directed to the relevant guard nodes εo,G-SLAM = 0. For A-SLAM where the wake-up signal is broadcast in a onehop neighborhood εo,A-SLAM = Twarmup . Awarmup.
Case II: (Tcontrol + Twarmup) ≤ Tdata with t = Tdata – (Tcontrol + Twarmup)
The end-to-end delay for SLAM in this case is exactly the same as that of Case I (Equation (5)) after exchanging
Tdata with (Twarmup + Tcontrol).
Ω SLAM ( h) = Tcontol + Twarmup + Tdata + ( h − 1)(Tdata ) = h ⋅ Tdata + (Tcontrol + Twarmup )
(11)
The end-to-end delay for Baseline-LM is exactly the same as that of Case I, (6). In this case, the additional endto-end delay imposed by SLAM is fixed and does not depend on the number of hops between S and D
Ω SLAM − Add (h) = Ω SLAM (h) − Ω Base − LM (h) = Tcontrol + Twarmup
(12)
For the energy, again we consider both Baseline-OD and On-Demand SLAM.
Baseline-OD: the energy for S and D are exactly the same as that of Case I (Equations (9) and (10)). The energy
of the forwarding nodes is the same as that of Case I after replacing (Twarmup + Tcontrol) with Tdata.
ε f ,base = Twarmup ⋅ Awarmup + Tdata ⋅ ( Aactive +Atransmit )
(13)
On-Demand SLAM: All energy computations are the same as in Case I.

Now consider that there are η concurrent flows going on in the network. The total energy consumed by all the
nodes is maximized when there is no spatial and temporal overlap between the multiple flows. In this case the
total number of nodes involved is the sum of the number of nodes involved in each flow. (This arises from the
fact that

η

η

i =1

i =1

∪ Ai ≤ ∑ Ai .)

The area of the bounding box, Figure 5, as a function of the number of hops between S and D, h, is A(h) =
2r2(h+1). The total number of nodes in the bounding box N(h) = A(h)ρ, where ρ is the density. The number of
forwarding nodes F(h) = h-1. The number of guard nodes G(h) = 0.55N(h)-F(h) [37]. The number of other nodes
O(h) = N(h)-(F(h)+G(h)). Next we compute the total expected energy over all the flows for both Baseline-OD and
On-Demand SLAM, ignoring the energy of S and D.
Baseline-OD: The expected energy expended by the entire set of forwarding nodes for a single flow is
E[ε { f },1.base ] = ε f ,base ⋅ E[ F (h)]
(14)
On-Demand SLAM: The expected energy expended by the entire set of nodes in the bounding box for a single
flow is

E[ε { N },1, SLAM ] ≤ ε f , SLAM ⋅ E[ F (h)] + ε g , SLAM ⋅ E[G (h)] + ε o , SLAM ⋅ E[O( h)]

(15)

These computations depend on the value of E[h]. To compute E[h], consider the source S at the center of a set
of concentric circles – the first one of radius r (the transmission range), the second of radius 2r, and so on. The
nodes in the second ring are two hops away from S, those in the third ring are three hops away, and so on. Let the
number of nodes in ring i be mi. Assuming a Poisson process for distribution of the nodes with rate ρ. mi = πr2ρ
when i=1 and mi= π[((i+1)r)2-(ir)2] when i>1. In general, through simplification, mi = πr2ρ(2i-1)
Γ
Γ
m
E[h] = ∑ i ⋅ i , where Γ is such that ∑ m j = n
(16)
n
i =1
j =1

11

21
SLAM Extra Delay (ms)

In Figure 6, we plot the extra delay of SLAM over
Baseline-LM for cases I (Equation (7)) and II
(Equation (12)) above with Tdata = 7ms and t =1ms.
The figure shows that the additional delay due to SLAM
increases linearly with the number of hops for Case I
while it remains constant for Case 2.
The expected value of the total energy expended (for
all the η concurrent flows) is upper-bounded by η
times the energy for a single flow.
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Figure 6: Extra delay due to SLAM over
Baseline-LM

5

Simulation Results

We use the ns-2 simulator [42] to simulate a data exchange protocol over a network with local monitoring
enabled according to the protocol in [37]. We simulate two scenarios individually without A-SLAM (the baseline)
and with A-SLAM. The baseline is an implementation of a state-of-the-art local monitoring protocol presented in
[37]. A-SLAM scenario is built on top of the baseline scenario to provide sleep-wake service for the guards. Nodes
are distributed randomly over a square area with a fixed average node density, 100 nodes over 204m×204m. Each
node acts as a source and generates data according to a Poisson process with rate m. The destination is chosen at
random and is changed using an exponential random distribution with rate λ. A route is evicted if unused for
TOutRoute time. The experimental parameters are given in Table 1. The results are averages over 30 runs. The
malicious nodes are chosen at random so that they are more than 2 hops away from each other.
Table 1: Default simulation parameters
Parameter
Tx Range (r)

Value
30 m

Parameter

Value
Parameter
Value
1500 sec
Destination change rate (λ) 0.02 per sec Simulation time
Number
of 8
Number of malicious 4
Fraction
of
data 0.6
neighbors (NB)
nodes (M)
monitored (fdat)
0.1 per sec
Watch time (Tw)
TOutRoute
50 sec
30ms
Packet generation rate (m)
Channel BW
40 kbps Warm up time (Twarmup)
5ms
Number of nodes (N)
100
Adversary model: We are simulating a selective forwarding attack launched by a group of malicious nodes that
collude and establish wormholes in the network [38], [44]-[46]. During the wormhole attack, a malicious node
captures packets from one location in the network, and “tunnels” them to another malicious node at a distant
point, which replays them locally. This makes the tunneled packet arrive either sooner or with a lesser number of
hops compared to the packets transmitted over normal multihop routes. This creates the illusion that the two end
points of the tunnel are very close to each other. The two malicious end points of the tunnel may use it to pass
routing traffic to attract routes through them and then launch a variety of attacks against the data traffic flowing
on the wormhole, such as selectively dropping the data packets. Unless otherwise mentioned, each node
selectively drops a packet passing through it with uniform probability of 0.6.
Variable Input metrics: (i) Fraction of data monitored (fdat) – each guard node randomly monitors a given
fraction of the data packets. At other times, it can be asleep from the point of view of a guard’s responsibility. (ii)
Data traffic load (μ). (iii) Number of malicious nodes (M) – the number of malicious nodes that collude to
establish wormholes and afterwards selectively drop the data.
Output metrics: Delivery ratio – the ratio of the number of packets delivered to the destination to the number of
packets sent out by a node averaged over all the nodes in the network. Watch buffer size – the runtime count of the
maximum size of the watch buffer being maintained at a guard, measured in number of entries. The maximum is
taken over all the guards. % Average monitor wakeup time – the time a node has to wakeup specifically to do
monitoring averaged over all the nodes as a percentage of the simulation time. Average end-to-end delay – the
time it takes a data packet to reach the final destination averaged over all successfully received data packets. %
True isolation – the percentage of the total number of malicious nodes that is isolated. % False isolation – the
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percentage of the total number of nodes that is isolated due to natural collisions on the wireless channel. Isolation
latency – the time between when the node performs its first malicious action to the time by which all the
neighbors of the node have isolated it averaged over all isolated malicious nodes.
Note that our goal is not to show the variation of the output metrics with the input parameters for local
monitoring, since that has been amply covered in [36][37]. Our goal here is to study the relative effect on local
monitoring with ASLAM and without.

5.1

Effect of fraction of data monitored
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The amount of data traffic is typically several orders of magnitude larger than the amount of control traffic. It
may not be reasonable for a guard node to monitor all the data traffic in its monitored links. Therefore a
reasonable optimization is to monitor only a fraction of the data traffic. In this set of experiments, our goal is to
investigate the effect of this optimization quantified by the fraction fdat on the output metrics.
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Figure 7: Effect of fraction of data monitored on (a) delivery ratio, (b) % true isolation, and (c) end-to-end
delay for both SLAM and the baseline
Figure 7 shows the variations of delivery ratio, % true isolation, and end-to-end delay as we vary fdat. Figure 7
(a) shows that the % delivery ratio is almost stable above 90% irrespective of the value of fdat. This desirable
effect is achieved by proper selection of the MalC increment for each value of fdat. The MalC increment is
designed with an inverse relation to the fdat. Figure 7 (b) shows that the % of true isolation is almost stable as we
vary fdat due to the same reasoning as for Figure 7 (a). Importantly, the delivery ratio and the % true isolation in
A-SLAM are close to the baseline for all values of fdat. However, the results in A-SLAM are slightly worse than
those of the baseline. This is because some of the data packets are additionally dropped in A-SLAM by forwarding,
destination, or guard nodes that happen to be asleep when the data packet arrives. This unwanted sleep may occur
due to collision in the sleep-wake control channel which prevents the respective nodes from waking up. Although
the control channel is a separate channel contention still occurs, where a guard of two consecutive links are sent
separate wake-up signals concurrently. Figure 7 (c) shows that the end-to-end delay is slightly higher for A-SLAM
due to the additional warm up time required when the source sends a packet to the first hop.
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Figure 8: Effect of fdat on (a) % false isolation; (b) isolation latency; (c) watch buffer size for local
monitoring with and without SLAM
Figure 8 shows the variations of % false isolation (Figure 8 (a)), isolation latency (Figure 8 (b)), and watch
buffer size (Figure 8 (a)) as we vary fdat. Figure 8 (a) clearly shows that the maximum watch buffer size in ASLAM
is close to the base line. Figure 8 (a) shows that the % false isolation is slightly lower for ASLAM than the baseline
since some of the packets that may falsely identify a node as malicious may get lost in ASLAM due to unwanted
sleep, which lowers the % false isolation. Figure 8 (b) shows that the isolation latency in ASLAM is higher than
that of the baseline due to data packets that may be missed while a node is in unwanted sleep. This causes the
malicious counters at the guards to reach the threshold value of detection slower, and consequently increases the
time of detection and isolation. Figure 8 (c) shows that as the fraction of data monitored increases, the watch
buffer size increases due the increase in the number of packets monitored. This shows the benefit in terms of
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overhead by monitoring only a small fraction of packets while maintaining almost the same detection coverage
(Figure 7). However, note that even though the watch buffer sizes in A-SLAM and the baseline are close, that in
A-SLAM is slightly higher. This is due to the extra delay in packet forwarding in A-SLAM due to warm up of the
nodes before sending the data. This delay causes the monitored packets to stay longer in the watch buffer thereby
increasing its size.

5.2

Effect of number of malicious nodes

In this section we study the relative effect of varying the number of malicious nodes on the output metrics.
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Figure 9: Effect of number of malicious nodes on (a) % delivery ratio, (b) % true isolation, and (c) % false
isolation for local monitoring with and without ASLAM
Figure 9 shows the variations of % delivery ratio, % true isolation, and % false isolation as we vary the number
of malicious nodes (M). Figure 9 (a) shows that the % delivery ratio slightly decreases as M increases. This is due
to the packets dropped before the malicious nodes are detected and isolated. As the number of malicious nodes
increases, this initial drop increases and thus the delivery ratio decreases. Figure 9 (b) shows that the % true
isolation also slightly decreases as we increase M. This is because the number of available guards in the network
decreases as more and more nodes get compromised. These two metrics in A-SLAM are slightly lower than those
of the base line due to the unwanted sleep described in the explanation of Figure 7. Figure 9 (c) shows that the %
false isolation increases as we increase M. This is because not all guard nodes come to the decision to isolate a
malicious node at the same time. Therefore, a given guard node may suspect another guard node when the latter
isolates a malicious node but the former still has not. The occurrence of this situation increases with M and hence
the % of false isolation increases with M. For example, a guard node G1 detects a malicious node M earlier than
the other guard nodes for the link to M. G1 subsequently drops all the traffic forwarded to M and is therefore
suspected by other guard nodes for M. This problem can be solved by having an authenticated one-hop broadcast
whenever a guard node performs a local detection. The % false isolation in A-SLAM is lower than that of the
baseline. Again, this is because some of the packets that may falsely identify a node as malicious may get lost in
ASLAM due to unwanted sleep.
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Figure 10: Effect of number of malicious nodes on (a) watch buffer size, (b) isolation latency, and (c) endto-end delay with and without ASLAM
Again, Figure 10 confirms that ASLAM has a very close behavior on the output metrics as the baseline. The
slight change is due to the same effects that we show in the explanation of Figure 7 and Figure 8.

5.3

Effect of data traffic load (μ)

In this section we study the effect of varying the data traffic load on the output metrics.
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Figure 11: Effect of data traffic load on (a) % false isolation, (b) isolation latency, and (c) end-to-end delay
for local monitoring with and without SLAM
Figure 11 shows the variations of % false isolation, isolation latency, and end-to-end delay as we vary the data
traffic load (1/μ). Figure 11 (a) shows that the % false isolation increases as the traffic load increases (1/μ
increases). As the traffic load increases, the probability of collision increases. This in turn increases the possibility
of false accusation since a guard, say G, may falsely accuse a node, say A, of not forwarding a packet if either G
has a collision when A forwards or A has a collision while receiving the packet. The explanation of the relative
performance with and without A-SLAM is the same as for Figure 9 (c). Figure 11 (b) shows that the isolation
latency increases as the traffic load increases. As the traffic load increases, the MalC increment decreases. This
causes the MalC threshold to be reached slower at a guard node, which results in increasing the isolation latency
of the malicious nodes. Also the higher traffic load lays it open to the possibility of some packets being missed
due to natural collisions and thereby preventing the increment to the malicious counter and therefore, reaching the
threshold faster. Note that the isolation latency in A-SLAM is higher than that of the baseline because of the
additional packets missed due to the unwanted sleep. Figure 11 (c) shows that end-to-end delay increase as the
traffic load increases due the higher contention for the channel. The relative explanation of end-to-end delay with
and without A-SLAM is the same as that of Figure 8.
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Figure 12: Effect of data traffic load on (a) % delivery ratio, (b) % true isolation, and (c) watch buffer size
with and without SLAM
Again, Figure 12confirms that ASLAM has a very close behavior on the output metrics as the baseline. The
slight change is due to the same effects that we show in the explanation of Figure 7 and Figure 8.

5.4

Wakeup time variations

In this section, we study the effect of varying the fraction of data monitored (fdat), the number of malicious
nodes (M), and the data traffic load (μ) on the percentage of time that a node needs to stay awake using A-SLAM
to fulfill the quality of service measures imposed by the underlying local monitoring scheme.
Figure 13 (a) shows that the percentage of wakeup time required for monitoring increases as the fraction of
monitored data increases due to the increase in the number of data packets that a node needs to overhear in its
neighborhood. Figure 13 (b) shows that the percentage of wakeup time decreases as we increase the number of
malicious nodes. As the number of malicious nodes increases, the number of data packets in the system decreases
since the malicious nodes are isolated and disallowed from generating data packets. Therefore, the number of
packets that need to be monitored decreases, which results in a decrease in the average percentage of wakeup
monitor time. Figure 13 (c) shows that the average percentage of monitoring wakeup time increases as the data
traffic load increases due the increase of data packets that need to be monitored.
Overall, compared to the no sleeping case, A-SLAM saves 30%-129% listening energy for different amounts of
data traffic load (μ).
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Figure 13: Variations on the percentage of monitoring wakeup time as we vary (a) the fraction of data
monitored (fdat); (b) number of malicious nodes (M); and (c) data traffic load (μ)

5.5

Effect of distance on delay
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We evaluate the variations of the end-to-end delay with the number of hops between the source and destination
pairs. Figure 14 (a) shows that the end-to-end delay in A-SLAM is always higher than that of the baseline due to
the warm-up time needed to wake up the nodes before sending the data. However, due the scheduling strategy in
A-SLAM in which each node sends a wake-up signal at the earliest possible opportunity (Section 3.4.3), the
warm-up time is only in the critical path at the first hop and therefore, the delay is not cumulative with the number
of hops. Figure 14 (b) shows that the difference in the end-to-end delay has a horizontal trend – it fluctuates
between 6.5 and 10 ms due to the randomness in the traffic pattern and the location of the source-destination pair.
The standard deviation in the difference is only 9.1%, expressed as a percentage of the baseline delay. This
horizontal trend of the additional delay due to SLAM follows the trend obtained analytically in Section 4.2 for the
case when (Tcontrol + Twarmup) < Tdata which is true in these simulation settings.
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Figure 14: (a) Variation of the end-to-end delay with the hop count for local monitoring with and without
A-SLAM; (b) the difference in the end-to-end delay with and without A-SLAM
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Conclusion

In this paper, we have presented a protocol called SLAM to make local monitoring in sensor networks energyaware while maintaining the detection coverage. We classify the domain of sleep-wake protocols into three
classes and SLAM correspondingly has three manifestations depending on which baseline sleeping protocol (BSP)
is used in the network. For the first class (synchronized sleep-wake), local monitoring needs no modification. For
the second class (connectivity-coverage preserving sleep-wake), local monitoring can call the BSP with changed
parameter values. For the third class (on-demand sleep-wake), adapting local monitoring is the most challenging
and requires hardware support as low-power or passive wake-up antennas. We propose a scheme whereby before
communicating on a link, a node awakens the guard nodes responsible for local monitoring on its next hop. We
design the scheme to work with adversarial node behavior. We prove analytically that On-Demand SLAM does not
weaken the security property of local monitoring. Simulation experiments bring out that over a wide range of
conditions, the performance of local monitoring with SLAM is comparable to that without SLAM, while listening
energy savings of 30-129 times is realized, depending on the network load. Our ongoing work is looking at
providing security guarantees in mobile ad hoc networks and building trust framework for such networks.
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